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Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) navigate using Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS),
but GNSS vulnerability precludes its use as the only means of navigation and requires
a secondary means of navigation. A differentiating characteristic of UAS is their periodic
communications with the ground station. This paper analyses the adequacy of employing
UAS Command, Control and Communications (C3) as a secondary means of navigation.
With no additional infrastructure, an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) is used to process
C3 messages and to obtain the positions of the UAS. Navigation accuracy and integrity are
calculated in a scenario with three UAS. The obtained results meet the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) requirements.
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1. INTRODUCTION. The large number of navigation systems in today’s
aircraft have motivated studies regarding the integration and fusion of various
legacy navigation sources, where different architectures providing fault tolerance
are evaluated (e.g., Baraniello and Corraro, 2010). The MITRE Corporation Center
for Advanced Aviation System Development presents results from a human-in-the-
loop study of cockpit display of trafﬁc information enabled delegated separation,
which is based on the availability in the cockpit of the surrounding trafﬁc information
(Domino et al., 2010).
Table 1 summarises the accuracies in nautical miles (NM) required by ICAO in the
latest version of the Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) Manual (ICAO, 2008).
The initial 4 rows (RNAV 10 to RNAV 1) correspond to the accuracies of RNAV
(aRea NAVigation) in which the less restrictive value corresponds to the operations
over oceanic areas (10 NM). The values of 5 NM and 2 NM are the accuracies that are
applicable to the continental and arrival phases, respectively, and the more restrictive
accuracy (1 NM) is also applicable to several phases in the approach.
The last 3 rows of Table 1 are the accuracies required to perform operations in
Required Navigation Performance (RNP). The main difference between RNAV and
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RNP is the requirement in RNP, which is to monitor the on-board performance
and send an alert when the performances are not fulﬁlled (Brooker, 2011). The most
stringent case regarding accuracy corresponds to the ﬁnal phase of the approach,
which requires an accuracy of 0·3 NM.
Table 1 also summarises the required alarm values for integrity. The monitoring
system will sound an alarm when the calculated conﬁdence level is larger than 20 NM
for the RNAV 10 or 10 NM for the RNAV 5 in the case of oceanic operations. The
alarm for the approach phase is 0·6 NM, and the most restrictive value for operations
in continental airspace is 2 NM.
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) provide the positioning accuracy
required by the majority of navigation speciﬁcations. However, GNSS technology has
proven to be vulnerable to interferences to an extent that precludes its use as the only
means of navigation (Bonnor, 2012; Volpe, 2001).
The monitoring and alarm capabilities required in RNP regards the concepts of
integrity, continuity and availability. This paper evaluates the capacity of the relative
navigation concept to provide integrity using the values stated in ICAO (2008). The
concepts of continuity and availability are not evaluated in this paper.
The employment of a signal of opportunity as a source for positioning has been a
topic of research in various communication scopes. Palmer et al., (2011) proposes the
use of a Digital Audio Broadcasting signal for positioning purposes. Ciurana et al.,
(2006) proposes a methodology for tracking inWireless Local Area Network locations
with Time Of Arrival (TOA) measurements. Qu and Zhang, (2011) propose a
methodology to obtain the location of a faulty Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) using
the communications with the remainder of the UAV in the same multi-UAV ﬂight.
This method assumes the capability of obtaining a range of measurements from the
other UAV but does not consider the emissions of the other half of Unmanned Air
Systems (UAS), i.e., the Ground [control] Stations (GS).
This paper is structured to include a context section, in which this study is introduced
through related studies in Section 2, and continues with Section 3 explaining the
methodology employed for navigation. The actual simulation performed is described
in the Section 4, and the obtained results are explained in Section 5. Finally, Section 6
states the main achievements and identiﬁes several future studies.
2. CONTEXT. Air transportation systems are migrating from using a
technology-oriented approach based on legacy systems, to a performance-based
Table 1. Required Accuracy Values (NM, 95% time) and Alarm Limits (NM, Prob=10−7).
Navigation Speciﬁcations Flight Phase Accuracy Alarm Limit
RNAV 10 En route (oceanic) 10 20
RNAV 5 En route, Arrival 5 10
RNAV 2 En route, Arrival, Departure 2 4
RNAV 1 En route, Arrival, Approach, Departure 1 2
RNP 4 En route 4 8
Basic-RNP 1 Arrival, Approach, Departure 1 2
RNP APCH Approach (Final) 0·3 0·6
116 JORGE RAMIREZ AND OTHERS VOL. 66
approach in which the performance indicators to be fulﬁlled by the air transportation
system in communication, navigation and surveillance are deﬁned; the support
technologies must comply with these indicators. Kerczewski and Kraft, (2006) give an
overview of the required performances and the beneﬁts that the performance-based
approach could provide. Kozco, (2010) offers an overview of upcoming technologies
and their impact on navigation, surveillance and communication. Stroup et al., (2010)
analyses the air-ground integration challenges in NextGen identifying the UAS
interoperability as a key question for UAS integration.
2.1. Aeronautical Communications. EUROCONTROL/FAA, (2007) summar-
ises the recommendations of Eurocontrol and the Federal Aviation Administration for
future communications interoperability, assessing several aspects such as the spectrum
bands for new systems and identifying the communication roadmap.
A more updated general overview of the current aeronautical communications
(mainly based on voice communications), as well as their potential (mainly data-links)
to address frequency depletion, is offered by Kamali, (2010).
The compatibility of the legacy aeronautical infrastructure in an L-band with the
envisaged physical layer for the aeronautical data-link has been evaluated in Schnell
et al., (2010) showing an absence of interference problems when using Time Division
Multiple Access (TDMA).
The synchronism mechanisms for the clock of the datalink are not considered in
the present study which assumes accuracies of 100 ns, which are in line with existing
technologies (Symmetricom, 2009).
2.2. UAS Communications. The communications to be employed by UAS are
currently under discussion among the involved players in forums such as
the EUROCAE WG-73 and the RTCA SC-203, where the contributions to the
International Telecommunication Unit conference are decided.
In conventional aviation, communications are performed on-demand. The UAS
architecture, with the ﬂight crew displaced to the ground, introduces telemetry and
Command and Control (C2), which are required during all the phases of the ﬂight to
ensure situational awareness of the ﬂight crew as well as the ﬂight crew’s capacity to
take control of the ﬂight at any moment.
Currently employed communications in generic UAS are described in Barnard
(2007), including an estimation of the data throughput required for the command and
status messages, and Barnard proposes a frequency of 4 Hz for the update.
Howell et al., (2010) explains the use of a surrogate aircraft by the NASA (National
Aeronautics and Space Administration) Langley Research Center. The evaluated
communications resulted in an estimated update frequency of between 3Hz and 7 Hz,
including both uplink and downlink for control.
From an air navigation service provider perspective, Eurocontrol evaluates the
saturation of the UAS C2 channel considering different scenarios of UAS deployment
with message reporting frequency of approximately 5 Hz (EUROCONTROL, 2010).
Table 2 summarises the data rates proposed in the above-mentioned studies for the
UAS datalink. The worst case for navigation purposes is deﬁned by the lowest data
rate (1 Hz) because it offers fewer measurements than the other data rates.
3. NAVIGATION METHODOLOGY. We propose a navigation solution
using the 2 coordinates of the horizontal plane (x, y), as the geometric value of
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z (height) will only occasionally match the value required by aviation (barometric
altitude).
3.1. Problem Statement. A wireless communication network is assumed based
on a TDMA access shared by all of the UAS and GS. The use of a TDMA network
provides an explicit knowledge of the time of emission tei of the exchanged messages
among n users. The clock synchronism required by the TDMA allows for the
measurement of the TOA tA of the message in the same time scale as that of the
emitter, i.e., the time shared by the TDMA users.
Dmi = c(tA − tei ) (1)
However, the real world introduces several errors in Di
m that result in pseudo-ranges
of the measurements (ρi). Let ρi be the measured range from an emitter i located at
known coordinates (xi,yi). If the unknown position of the receiver is (x, y), this
measured range can be expressed as follows:
ρi =
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
x− xi( )2+(y− yi)2
√
+ c (dt) − c (dti) + ej (2)
where c is the speed of light.
In fact, the transmitter applies its transmission time pattern with a bias (dt).
Moreover, the receiver clock measurements will always have a residual clock
synchronism bias (dti); therefore, the actual reception time will be at ti=T+dti.
Finally, ej accounts for all non-modelled propagation factors.
Then, if Equation (2) is linearised around an approximate position (x0, y0, t0), we
obtain:
ρi  ρi0 +
x0 − xi
ρi0
dx+ y0 − yi
ρi0
dy+ cdt (3)
where ρi0 is the approximate range for emitter i: ρi0 =
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
(x0 − xi)2 + (y0 − yi)2
√
.
Deviations from this approximated position are given by dx=x−x0, dy=y−y0 and
cdt. Writing the previous equation for all n emitter measurements in matrix form leads
to the following equation:
ρ1 − ρ10
..
.
ρn − ρn0



 
x0 − x1
D10
y0 − y1
D10
1
..
. ..
. ..
.
x0 − xn
Dn0
y0 − yn
Dn0
1




·
dx
dy
dt



 (4)
Table 2. Communication Frequencies (Hz).
Command and Control (C2)
Telemetry
Reference Uplink Downlink
(Barnard, 2007) 4 4 [1,20]
(Howell et al., 2010) [3,7]
(EUROCONTROL, 2010) 5
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or, more compactly:
Z  H · X (5)
where, adopting GNSS positioning nomenclature:
Z is the observables vector.
X is the unknown (or state) vector.
H is the geometry matrix.
Note that in GNSS positioning, a single receiver measures the ranges sent by several
emitters (satellites). The emitter clock biases are expected to be known (more precisely,
are estimated with the information contained in the GNSS navigation message), while
the receiver clock bias is the third unknown to be computed along with the receiver
position (Parkinson and Spilker, 1996; Hernandez-Pajares et al., 2005).
In our scenario, we also have several network users emitting messages that
are employed at the receiver to measure the time of ﬂight. Clock synchronisation is
assumed among the network users using high accuracy clocks. The synchronism
allows for the measurement of the TOA in a common basis, which is further improved
by calculating the clock bias of the receiver as the third variable of the state vector.
A system, such as Equations (4) or (5), is written each time a measurement is
performed. In this paper, we propose the use of an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF),
aiming at solving the time-evolving Equation (5) that allows the use of the speed
and status information transmitted over the network to improve the solution of the
equation. The EKF minimises the weighted sum of the squares of the estimation
errors, where the weights of each variable are given according to the inverse of the
noise variance of the variable (Welch and Bishop, 2001).
Figure 1 summarises the EKF process, in which the estimation of the state vector X
and its associated covariance matrix PXˆ are computed at each iteration of the ﬁlter,
combining the following:
. A prediction obtained from the previous state with a transition matrix (A) and
a process noise (Q).
. The measurements Z and the associated updates on the measurement noise (PY)
and the geometry (or measurement) matrix H.
3.2. Conﬁdence Level. ICAO deﬁnes the cross track error (ect), in ICAO, (2008),
as the minimum distance from the actual point to the trajectory. The proposed EKF
calculates the UAV position in a Cartesian space with North and East as the reference
frame.
Deﬁning ect as the magnitude related to the directional components of the error
(ex, ey), we assume that a Rayleigh distribution can be observed. Equation (6) shows
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the Rayleigh distribution for a
variable x:
F x( ) = 1− e− x
2
2σ2 (6)
where:
x =
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
− ln 1− F x( )( )2σ2
√
 x = σ
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
−2 ln 1− F x( )( )
√
(7)
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Next, a conﬁdence interval of 1–10−7, as required by ICAO, is obtained for a value
of & 5, 6777 times the σ of the error distribution. Because the exact distribution of
the error is unknown, the protection level equations stated in Appendix J of RTCA,
(2006) are applied to obtain an over-bound of the real σ.
dmajor =
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
d2east + d2north
2
+
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
d2east − d2north
( )
2
( )2
+d2en
√√√√√ (8)
Equation (8) deﬁnes the σ to be employed in Equation (7) (dmajor) as a combination
of several values of the law of the propagation of errors, as indicated in Equation (9).
In the Global Positioning System (GPS) positioning, the concept of Dilution of
Precision uses the law of the propagation of errors to estimate the conﬁdence level that
the positioning could offer in the same coordinate frame (Langley, 1999).
HT ·W ·H( )−1= d
2
east den det
dne d2north dnt
dte dtn d2time



 (9)
Equation (9) provides the covariance along the diagonal for each component
(East, North and time) and the correlation between the variables outside the diagonal
that propagated from each measure using the User Equivalent Range Error (UERE)
due to the geometry of the problem (H). The weighted matrix required in Equation (9)
is deﬁned in Equation (10). It is a diagonal matrix with the square of the inverse of the
Figure 1. Extended Kalman Filter.
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UERE value for each measure:
W =
1
σ21
0 . . . 0
0
1
σ22
. . . 0
..
. ..
. . .
. ..
.
0 0 . . .
1
σ2n




(10)
H P L = K · dmajor (11)
It should be noted that the Horizontal Protection Level (HPL) calculated in
Equation (11) represents an upper bound for the σ of the positioning error as the
considered error depends on the direction of the trajectory; therefore, the estimated
HPL depends on the geometry of the different measures employed.
4. SIMULATION. The envisaged simulation attempts to evaluate the per-
formance of a secondary means of navigation on the basis of the C3 communications
between a UAV and its GS, which operates from a static position.
A fault-free navigation position is calculated as a result of the distance
measurements between the target and the other users. Assuming that the primary
navigation mean (GPS) positioning is not available at the target, the positions of the
remaining users are obtained from their GPS and are propagated through a TDMA-
based network in which the communicating nodes (UAV and GS) are capable of
maintaining the synchronisation of their clocks with a common time basis.
To provide a realistic assessment of the accuracy and integrity that relative
navigation could offer, a scenario has been simulated with three UAS ﬂying
simultaneously signiﬁcant trajectories of existing aerial works for a period of
24 hours. UAS communicates with their respective GS with 1-s communication
latencies and 100-ns clock accuracies.
4.1. Vehicles Trajectories. While a rich scenario could be envisaged in a
metropolitan area, a reduced subset of meaningful UAS operations has been selected
as the trajectories to be simulated:
. Trafﬁc monitoring: Figure 2a.
. Lifeguard supervision of the coastline: Figure 2b.
. Vineyard monitoring: Figure 2c.
A trajectory similar to several of the main motorways surrounding Barcelona has
been simulated in Figure 2a. The motorways connecting Barcelona with the major
Spanish cities as well as the European motorways have not been considered. The entire
ﬂight has been simulated at a constant speed of 40 m/sec.
A lifeguard ﬂight has been simulated in Figure 2b. Although almost the entire
coastline of Catalonia has signiﬁcant beaches, only the monitoring of a small portion
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of the coastline has been simulated. The entire ﬂight has been simulated at a constant
speed of 20 m/sec.
A small vineyard monitoring ﬂight has been simulated in Figure 2c. Despite the
large area of vineyards that exist in Catalonia, only a small vineyard monitoring
ﬂight has been simulated. The entire ﬂight has been simulated at a constant speed of
10 m/sec.
Figure 3 shows the relative positions of the GS and the ﬂight paths. The green
triangle represents the location of the GS that controls the lifeguard UAV (trajectory
in green). The magenta triangle represents the position of the GS that controls
the UAV performing agricultural air works in the vineyard (trajectory in magenta).
Finally, the blue triangle placed on the coastline of Barcelona represents the GS of
the UAV monitoring the trafﬁc of the metropolitan area of Barcelona.
4.2. Communications.
4.2.1. Visibility. Table 3 summarises the selected static model of visibility
between the UAV and the GS. Sub-indexes t, l and v stand for trafﬁc, lifeguard and
vineyard, respectively.
In the reduced visibility scenario (
√
), each UAV could see the other UAVs and
its own GS as a minimum. Additionally, UAVl could see GSt, and UAVt could see GSl.
(a) Traffic Monitoring (b) Lifeguard
(c) Vineyard 
Figure 2. Simulated Trajectories.
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The visibility model summarised in Table 3 does not take advantage of all the
available transmission-to-measurement distances, discarding accurate measurements
from the static positions. In the case of UAVt and UAVl, the discarded measurements
correspond to GSv.
In the case of UAVv, the measurements from GSt and GSl are discarded, retaining
two mobile references UAVt and UAVl and the ﬂight’s individual GSv as the only static
reference.
A slightly improved visibility model (
√
plus †) is also simulated to assess the effect
of adding measures to the equation system. The listener has the capability to receive
the messages sent by any of the other users. The number of measures ranges from
4 to 5 for UAVt and UAVl, respectively, and in the case of UAVv, the number of
measures ranges from 3 to 5.
4.2.2. Proposed Messages. The EKF is improved with additional information
available inside the C3 messages as follows:
. Position Report.
. Speed Vector.
. Clock Bias.
The self-positions of the remaining users are known at each position (air and
ground) from GPS. As part of the C3 messages, they will share their new position
every second.
Figure 3. Flight test and Ground Stations (GS) simulated.
Table 3. Visibility.
Emitter
Listener UAVt GSt UAVl GSl UAVv GSv
UAVt
√ √ √ √
†
UAVl
√ √ √ √
†
UAVv
√
†
√
†
√
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The speed of each aircraft can be retrieved from GPS but also from other sources,
such as the inertial systems or a combination of the compass and the speedometer. We
will assume that the speed is given as a three-dimensional vector (x, y, and z). The GS
will not report any speeds. Time measures and corrections are a signiﬁcant part of the
EKF. The calculated time corrections should be interpreted as the clock bias between
the receiver clock and the common network clock. We will assume that each aircraft
and ground station will calculate and propagate its own calculated clock bias. This
approach will result in our obtaining an estimation of the clock bias of each network
user as part of the EKF inputs.
Finally, we will assume that all three data types (position, speed and clock) are
packed in the same message in the low bandwidth scenario (one message per second)
deﬁned in Section 2.2, rather than increasing the number of messages and eventually
the frequency of communication.
4.3. Measures Generation. The navigation accuracy of the proposed algorithm is
veriﬁed using a simulated set of measurements obtained from the different trajectories,
as shown in Figure 4, and the results are compared with the actual position to test
the proposed accuracy. To obtain each measurement range, the next steps in the
simulation are as follows:
The intended position of the emitter and the receiver are computed.
Both the intended positions of the emitter and the receiver are modiﬁed with a
zero mean and a normally distributed noise, with σ=10m for x and y, and σ=2m
for z. The resulting simulated positions reﬂect the imperfection of the trajectory in the
real world.
These simulated positions are used to compute the actual range.
The actual range is modiﬁed by adding a synchronism noise (Nsynch) that is
introduced by the emitter (Ne) and the receiver (NRx).
Equation (12) shows how Nsynch is composed of the error between the emitter and
the reference time. dtsynch is simulated with an initial value that is normally distributed
with a zero mean and a standard deviation of 100 ns. Both the ageing component and
the noise deﬁned by the Allan variance are added to the initial value. Considering
c, Nsynch has values fewer than 30 m 68% of the time.
Nsynch = c ∗ dtsynch (12)
Figure 4. Measurement Generation.
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4.4. EKF Instantiation. As shown in Figure 1, EKF requires the deﬁnition of
A, Q, H, PY and Z for each iteration.
4.4.1. ‘A’ Dynamic Model. Because the navigation methodology proposed
in this paper beneﬁts from a large number of fairly reliable measures (Z ), the
dynamic behaviour of the UAV and the (x, y) coordinates can be simply modelled as
a kinematic process (Hernandez-Pajares et al., 2005). Accounting for the above
considerations, the transition matrix can be written as follows:
A =
0
0
0



 (13)
4.4.2. ‘Q’ Process Noise. Equation (14) shows the proposed process noise matrix:
Q =
q˙xΔt
q˙yΔt
cσεsynch
( )2



 (14)
where:
∆t is the time between two consecutive samples.
q˙j =
dσ2j
( )
dt is the spectral density of coordinate j,
which is deﬁned by a random process ( j={x, y}).
σεsynch is the standard deviation of the synchronism error of the clock.
q˙j =
dσ2j
( )
dt takes on the values of the known individual speeds.
The calculation of the clock bias simpliﬁes σεsynch to the Allan deviation σA because CAg
has a tendency to be slow enough to be absorbed in the value of the clock bias. Then,
the calculated clock bias is the sum of CAc and CAg, with σA as the clock source of error
for the process.
4.4.3. ‘H’ Geometry Matrix. As seen in Equation (4), each row of the geometry
matrix H is deﬁned as
x0−xi
Di0
y0−yi
Di0
, where (x0, y0) deﬁnes the estimation of the
individual position, and (xi, yi) deﬁnes the position of the emitter.
Each time that an incoming message is employed for measuring a distance, it is
calculated through an iteration of the EKF and the time employed since the last
measuring (∆tmeas) is calculated as well as the time since the position of each network
user was last reported (Δtrepi ).
The individual position (x0, y0) is obtained from the last position calculated (x0
−, y0
−)
by adding the displacement, as in Equation (15), where (Spx0, Spy0 ) is the individual
speed and ∆tmeas is the time since the last measurement.
x0
y0
( )
= x
−
0
y−0
( )
+ Spx0
Spy0
( )
Δtmeas (15)
The emitter’s position (xi, yi) is obtained from the last position reported (xi
−, yi
−) by
adding the displacement, as in Equation (16), where (Spxi , Spyi ) is the reposted speed
and ∆trep is the time elapsed since the position of the emitter was reported.
xi
yi
( )
= x
−
i
y−i
( )
+ Spxi
Spyi
( )
Δtrepi . (16)
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4.4.4. ‘PY’ Measurement Noise. The measurement covariance matrix is mod-
elled in this problem as:
PY =
σ21
. .
.
σ2n



 (17)
If we consider the different sources of error as independent, then they can be root-
sum-squared to obtain a value for σ. This value is known in GPS as the ‘UERE’. Then,
the UERE to be applied for each measure of distance from an emitter i is the sum of all
of the covariance of the individual sources of error (Equation 18):
σ2i = σ2clki + σ2clkr + σ2vi + σ2vr + σ2trop + σ2mult, (18)
where:
The variances of the error generated by the clock synchronism error of the
emitter σ2clki and the receiver σ
2
clkr are deﬁned using the Allan deviation σA of the
envisaged clocks multiplied by c (Symmetricom, 2009).
The covariance of the emitter position σ2vi and the receiver position σ
2
vr are deﬁned
using the declared accuracy performance of EGNOS in (ESA, 2009). If the
troposphere effect on the signal transmission has not been simulated, then the value
of σtrop
2 is assigned as 0. The multipath effect on the signal transmission has not been
simulated and, consequently, the value of σmult
2 is assigned as 0.
4.4.5. ‘Z’ Measures Reﬁnement. Z is deﬁned as the difference between the
pseudo-range and the distance estimation (ρi − ρi0 ). The accuracy of ρi is improved
when applying Equation (1) due to the knowledge of individual clock bias, which has
been calculated, and by the knowledge of the emitters’ clock bias, which has been
reported through the network.
In contrast, the ρi0 accuracy is improved as a result of the increased knowledge of
(x0, y0) and (xi, yi) presented by Equations (15) and (16).
5. RESULTS. The EKF of Section 3.1 is instantiated as explained in Section 4
for each trajectory, i.e., each trajectory has its own exclusive EKF to calculate
positioning. The obtained position is compared with the actual position, and the
along-track error (eat) and the cross-track error (ect) are calculated. The simulations
are performed with the low visibility scenario deﬁned by Table 3.
The ect is compared with the conﬁdence level calculated, as described in Section 3.3,
providing an assessment of the integrity of the navigation. The simulations are
performed with the low visibility scenario deﬁned by Table 3, and the case with the
worst integrity is compared against itself simulated with a slightly improved visibility
scenario deﬁned by Table 3.
5.1. Accuracy. Both eat and ect are compared with the ICAO performance
navigation accuracy required values of Table 1 in Section 1. The listed values are the
upper values and must not be exceeded more than 5% of the time to be considered
acceptable.
5.1.1. Along-Track Error. Figures 5a, 5b and 5c show the eat values of the
navigation solution. Both the lifeguard (Figure 5b) and vineyard (Figure 5c)
trajectories allow the error to be distributed under 40 m. The trafﬁc monitoring,
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which has a more exigent trajectory and a faster speed, increases its error threshold up
to 60 m.
Figures 6a, 6b and 6c show the histograms of the error. The trafﬁc monitoring error
has the greatest mean and standard deviation.
Table 4 summarises the basic statistics of the along-track error module. Trafﬁc
monitoring has an along-track mean eˉat of 25·87 m with a standard deviation σeat of
20·65 m.
Using the Rayleigh CDF of Equation (7), the required 95% accuracy is achieved at
a value of 50·55 m for the worst case (trafﬁc monitoring), which is in fact sufﬁcient to
comply with the most restrictive navigation speciﬁcation. For the case of the lifeguard
and the vineyard trajectories, their lower value of σeat also ensures compliance with the
stringent navigation speciﬁcations (RNP APCH).
5.1.2. Cross-Track Error. Figures 7a, 7b and 7c show the ect values in the
simulation. Both the lifeguard (Figure 7b) and vineyard (Figure 7c) trajectories allow
 (a) Traffic Monitoring (b) Lifeguard
(c) Vineyard 
Figure 5. Along-Track Errors.
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the error to be distributed under 20 m. The trafﬁc monitoring scenario, which is the
worst case, has an increased error threshold up to 30m.
Comparing eat (Figure 5) with ect (Figure 7), we could appreciate the better behav-
iour in the cross-track direction relative to the along-track direction. ect is interpreted
in aviation as trajectory abandonment, which is more sensitive in aviation than a delay
 (a) Traffic Monitoring (b) Lifeguard
(c) Vineyard 
Figure 6. Along-Track Frequencies.
Table 4. Along-Track Error Accuracy Statistics.
Trajectory
Statistic Trafﬁc Lifeguard Vineyard
eat 25·87 12·99 12·09
σeat 20·65 9·94 9·27
CDFeat (95%) 50·55 24·33 22·69
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or a time advance, which are the interpretations of eat. Therefore, the most sensitive
direction beneﬁts from a better accuracy, which is offered by the proposed EKF.
Figures 8a, 8b and 8c show the histograms of the error, and Table 5 shows the
statistical values.
The worst case in Table 5, the trafﬁc monitoring trajectory, has a mean error eˉct
of 8·78 m and a standard deviation σect of 5·81 m. Using the Rayleigh CDF of
Equation (7), the required 95% accuracy is achieved at a value of 14·22 m for the
worst case (trafﬁc monitoring), which is (as for eat) sufﬁcient to comply with the RNP
APCH. For the case of the lifeguard and the vineyard trajectories, with a lower σect the
compliance with RNP APCH is also improved.
Comparing the values of CDFect 95%( ) and CDFeat 95%( ) trajectory by trajectory,
the improvement in the accuracy of the cross-track error could be observed, which in
fact is most critical between eat and ect.
 (a) Traffic Monitoring (b) Lifeguard
(c) Vineyard 
Figure 7. Cross-Track Errors.
129C3 IN UAS AS A MEANS FOR SECONDARY NAVIGATIONNO. 1
5.2. Integrity. The conﬁdence level is calculated as explained in Section 3.3 and
compared with the actual error by displaying them in the same ﬁgure. The compliance
is assessed with the integrity requirements stated in Table 1 of Section 1.
5.2.1. Reduced Visibility. Simulating the relative navigation with the reduced
visibilities stated in Table 3 the conﬁdence levels of Figures 9a, 9b and 9c are obtained.
Figure 9c shows how the UAVv achieves the lowest conﬁdence level. This is a
consequence of the better geometry of the emitters employed compared with the
 (a) Traffic Monitoring (b) Lifeguard
(c) Vineyard 
Figure 8. Cross-Track Frequencies.
Table 5. ect Accuracy Statistics.
Trajectory
Statistic Trafﬁc Lifeguard Vineyard
ect 8·78 5·89 7·27
σect 5·81 3·96 5·25
CDFect (95%) 14·22 9·69 12·85
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geometry of the emitters employed at the remaining trajectories. Figure 9a shows how
the trafﬁc monitoring scenario beneﬁts from the better geometry of the employed
emitters than the lifeguard UAS. The conﬁdence level of the trafﬁc monitoring
trajectory is lower than the conﬁdence level of the lifeguard trajectory, and the inverse
relationship is true for the accuracy values in which the lifeguard trajectory (Figure 7b)
has better values than the trafﬁc monitoring trajectory (Figure 7a).
The integrity values obtained do not achieve the required values for RNP APCH
but comply with the RNP 1 navigation speciﬁcations.
Table 6 shows the compliance of the different trajectories with the navigation
speciﬁcations. Although all of the trajectories comply with RNAV 1 for 100% of
the time, compliance with RNP APCH could serve as a numeric indicator of the
sufﬁciency of the conﬁdence level. Using the percent-compliance values with RNP
APCH, it could be observed that the vineyard trajectory has the best compliance value
of 99·2%, followed by the lifeguard trajectory with an 88·3% compliance and ﬁnally,
the trafﬁc monitoring trajectory with an 82·6% compliance. Nevertheless, in Figures
 (a) Traffic Monitoring (b) Lifeguard
(c) Vineyard 
Figure 9. Conﬁdence Levels.
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9a and 9b, it could be observed that the tail approaches the upper values in the case of
the lifeguard trajectory, which has better compliance values with RNP APCH.
5.2.2. Improved Visibility. When the conﬁdence values that are achievable
with the visibilities shown in Table 3 are accessed, an improved version of the
communications can be simulated to assess the effect on the conﬁdence level of a
richer scenario.
Figure 10 shows how the conﬁdence values are improved from Figure 10a (reduced
visibility of Table 3) to Figure 10b (improved visibility of Table 3).
Table 7 shows how the conﬁdence level is dramatically improved from the standard
scenario in which the compliance with RNP APCH is 88·3% to the improved scenario
in which the value of compliance is increased to 96·6%.
6. CONCLUSIONS. This paper presents a relative navigation solution for
Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) that can be used as a secondary means of navigation.
UAS normal operation depends on frequent Command and Control (C2) messages
sent from vehicles to ground stations and vice versa. The navigation solution we
propose only uses these messages. No additional resources (new infrastructures or
additional radio frequencies) are required. Thus, this secondary navigation solution is
cost effective. The proposal assumes that UAS communicate using a Time Division
Multiple Access (TDMA) network. The message’s Time Of Arrival (TOA) is used to
Table 6. Integrity Alarm Values Compliance.
Trajectory
Navigation Speciﬁcations Trafﬁc Lifeguard Vineyard
RNAV 1 1 1 1
Basic-RNP 1 1 1 1
RNP APCH 0·826 0·883 0·992
 (a) Lifeguard (reduced visibility) (b) Lifeguard (improved visibility) 
Figure 10. Conﬁdence Level Improvement.
132 JORGE RAMIREZ AND OTHERS VOL. 66
calculate the distance between the receiver and the emitter. All distance measures are
reﬁned using an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF). The information of the messages is
used for this reﬁnement. In our proposal, all messages contain the position, speed and
clock bias of the emitter.
Accuracy results are always within 1 NM i.e., RNAV 1 (aRea NAVigation) and
RNP 1 (Required Navigation Performance) compliant for a simulated scenario, with
only 3 UAS and 1 message per second and per emitter. The mean accuracy values
are in the range of 5 m to 26 m, and the worst case has a 60m along-track error. In the
same simulation, the conﬁdence levels are also calculated. All of the conﬁdence level
values are compliant with the RNP 1 integrity requirements.
We conclude that a UAS can navigate in the most stringent RNP airspace even
when losing the Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) signal using the C2
signals of the other UAS. Utilising more than 3 UAS and/or higher frequencies of C2
messages are reasonable scenarios that will further improve the accuracy and integrity
values presented.
In the near future, UAS will become frequent users of non-segregated airspace.
More UAS communications represent more signals of opportunity. This increase
will provide better navigation accuracy and integrity not only to UAS but also to
conventional aircraft. Any airspace user can use this backup navigation method
with a very good accuracy, with only a low cost radio receiver listening on the UAS
frequency. In addition, as an example of communication / navigation / surveillance
integration, ground surveillance tasks will beneﬁt from UAS communications using
the proposed model.
Future work includes:
. Modelling multi-path and troposphere effects in the EKF.
. Studying a scenario where all UAS lose GNSS navigation at the same time.
. Improving ground station geometry by adopting a more peripheral distribution.
. Or, obtaining accuracy measures for scenarios in which UAS and conventional
aircrafts share airspace.
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Table 7. Improvement in Integrity Alarm Value Compliance.
Navigation Speciﬁcations
Trajectory
Lifeguard Improved Lifeguard
RNAV 1 1 1
Basic-RNP 1 1 1
RNP APCH 0·883 0·966
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